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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STA.TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through '. 
its Road Commission, ! 
Plaintiff-Respondent,, 
vs. I 
EYA WHITE and NOEL "\VHITE, ) 
her husband . z ' Defendants-Appe lants. 
Case No. 
10832 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Condemnation proceeding by plaintiff in the Dis-
trict Court of Summit County, State of Utah, to 
condemn 17. 70 acres of defendants' land and improve-
ments situated in Summit County, said condemned 
lands to be used by plaintiff for the purpose of con-
structing a portion of Interstate Highway 1-80. The 
1 
appellants appeal from the denial of a motion for addi-
tur ,or, in the alternative, a new trial, by the Third 
Judicial District Court, Summit County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
Trial of this case was had before a jury in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, by order of the 
court, before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge, on 
the 28th day of November, 1966, concluding on No-
vember 29, 1966. 
An amended judgment on the verdict was duly 1 
entered January 27, 1967, awarding these defendants 
the sum of $56,000 for value of land taken by plaintiff, 
$29,000 for the value of improvements taken by plain-
tiff, no severance damage to the remaining property 
by reason of the taking, for a total award of $85,000. 
Added to that amount was the sum of $4,626.50 as 
stipulated value for trade fixtures, for a total award of 
$89,626.50. Defendants filed a motion for additur, or, 
in the alternative, a new trial which, after hearing, was 
denied by the Honorable A. H. Ellett, whereupon ap-
pellants prosecuted this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the order of the Third Judi-
cial Court denying appellants' motion for additur, or, 
in the alternative, a new trial, be affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Respondent agrees fundamentally with the state-
ment of facts as contained in appellants' brief, how-
ever, respondent submits that the entry of respondent 
onto appellants' property and the partial removal and 
destruction of certain improvements located thereon 
was pursuant to the intended purpose for which the 
premises were sought by the respondent, and was neces-
sary and proper as part of the highway construction 
project (R-8, -9, -10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF AP-
PELLANTS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR, OR, 
FOR NEW TRIAL, SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO 
YIE'V THE PREMISES. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47 (j) states: 
When in the opinion of the court is is proper 
for the jury to have a view of the property which 
is the subject of litigation, ... it may order them 
to be conducted in a body under the charge of an 
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that 
purpose ... 
3 
The matter of allowing the jury to view the prem-
ises is purely one of trial court discretion. Such dis-
cretion has vested in the trial courts even under the 
common law, and the rule is applicable in eminent do-
main cases. See 53 Am. Jur., Trial § 441, 5 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain,§ 18.3 (3d ed. 1962); Johr, Eminent 
Domain, 371 (1953); Stat. 4 Anne, Ch. 16, § 8. 
The permitting of a view by the jury of property 
involved in litigation is a matter so largely in the dis-
cretion of the trial court that its decision will not be 
disputed except for palpable abuse. Balle v. Smith, 81 
Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 ( 1932). 
In many cases the courts have upheld the action 
of the trial court in allowing the jury to view the prem-
ises in question notwithstanding changed conditions 
of the property since the date of taking by the con-
demning authority. 
The fact that the condition of a part of the land 
taken has been materially changed after possession by 
the government did not show the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing the jury to view the premises 
after the conclusion of the examination of witnesses 
at trial where there was conflicting testimony as to 
the quality of land and other features affecting its value. 
Forbes v. United States, 268 Fed. 273 (5th Cir. 1920). 
Even where substantial changes have occurred in the 
land and improvements, the view by the jury of the 
subject property has been held not to constitute error 
or an abuse of discretion of the trial court. See United 
4 
States v. 2.4 Acres of Land, 138 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 
1943); South Park Cornrs. v. Livingston, 334 Ill. 368, 
176 N.E. 546 (1931), Annot. 77 A.L.R.2d 458, 571 
(1961). 
At the conclusion of the testimony and evidence, 
and prior to the jury being charged by the court and 
summation and argument of counsel, the trial court 
expressed its opinion that the jury should view the 
property, and made the following statement to the jury: 
... I want these gentlemen to see that place, 
so they will know better how to weigh the tes-
timony of the witnesses that have testified here. 
'Vhat you see won't constitute you an expert 
so you could go ahead and throw out this testi-
mony, but it will help you in weighing the testi-
mony of the witnesses .... (TR-185, 186}. 
Prior to that time evidence and testimony had been 
presented to the jury concerning the condition of the 
property, and the type and condition of the improve-
ments located thereon. Introduced in evidence were 
maps showing the configuration of appellants' prop-
erty, its contour and location with respect to adjoining 
properties, existing highways, and the proposed high-
way construction (Ex. P-1, P-2}. In addition, photo-
graphs of improvements had been introduced by ap-
pellants showing the condition of such improvements as 
of the date of taking by respondent, November 22, 
1965 (Ex. D-3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10). 
~ppellants had introduced extensive testimony 
describing the property and its condition and use as 
5 
of November 22, 1965. The entire testimony of appel-
lant Noel White was concerned with a description of 
the property, its uses, history, and condition (TR-
25-49). Appellants' appraiser, Mr. Kiepe, described 
the condition of the land and improvements ( Tr-70, 
Tr-75) as did another appraiser of appellants', Mr. 
Baum. (TR-116-119, TR-120, TR-131-133). 
The jury was well advised the condition of the 
premises was not the same at the time of trial as it was 
at the time of taking, November 22, 1965. Counsel for 
appellants stated in the presence of the jury: 
The remnants of the old demolished building 
and motel that the State has torn down is located 
at the westerly edge. ( TR-186) 
* * * 
This old building has been moved. The motel 
has been demolished, but the shell is there. (TR-
186) 
Discussion between the court and counsel in the 
presence of the jury produced the following: 
THE COURT: I believe someone said that 
the pictures show the situation, and I believe 
you gentlemen can agree that the inside knotty 
pine has been removed. 
MR. WALL: This is true. 
MR. WEGGELAND: Yes, and some of the 
trade fixtures have been removed also, Your 
Honor. These items of personal property are 
not an issue here. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
6 
:MR. YVEGGELAND: The exterior of the 
structures are in approximately the same con-
dition except they have been boarded up in a 
couple of instances. 
lVIR. 'VALL: The one building has been to-
tally demolished and moved away. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WALL: The improvements, as far as I 
am concerned, there would be nothing gained 
by looking at them. 
THE COURT: Well, it may be that they 
ought to take a look. There is a dispute in the 
amount of land that could be adapted to com-
mercial purposes. 
* * * 
MR. 'VALL: I wish we could have the State 
restore the improvements to the condition they 
were in in November 22 to give the jury a true 
impression, your Honor. The land doesn't change 
like the improvements 
THE COURT: The jurors will understand 
that the property has been-on the inside has 
been changed and altered, so it would be of no 
help to be studying the inside of it. The outside 
may be looked at, and particularly the amount 
of land, the amount that might be used for com-
mercial purposes, the amount that might be 
used for residential purposes, and the amount 
that might be used for grazing I suppose could 
be of help if the jurors were to see it. That will 
give us a little less rush time to get our instruc-
tions, and so I think probably I would let the 
sheriff carry out his responsibilities. We made 
arrangements for him to have cars at nine o'clock 
7 
in the morning, so if you gentlemen would come 
here, we would have sheriff to come up and 
make the arrangements with him to take you up. 
(TR-202-204) 
Following the view of the premises by the jury, 
they were instructed that the ten-unit motel, together 
with laundry facilities, had been totally taken by the 
plaintiff, and that the jury was instructed to consider 
said motel complex to be a total taking by the State 
of Utah and award to the defendant landowners such 
damages as the jury determined applicable thereto in 
accordance with the remainder of the other instructions. 
(Inst. 19, R90) 
The jury was properly instructed with respect to 
the purpose for viewing the premises and to the weight 
they should give to the knowledge gained thereby. The 
jury was instructed: 
* * • 
You are to consider the testimony of all wit-
nesses, but if after viewing the premises and 
after a consideration of all the evidence in this 
case you believ that any witness who has testi-
fied to the value of the land and the damage by 
reason of severance thereto gave testimony which 
is not the reasonable value thereof, you may dis-
regard that testimony even though it comes from 
an expert. (Inst. 21, R92) 
* * * 
You are instructed that any information or 
knowledge obtained by you while viewing the 
property involved in this case can be used by you 
8 
only for the purpose of determining the weight 
and applicability of the testimony and evidence 
introduced at the trial of this case. 
In other words, your view of the property in-
volved in this case is not evidence, in and of 
itself, upon which a verdict may be based, but 
it may be used only to aid you in better under-
standing and weighing the testimony brought 
forth by the witnesses who have appeared. (Inst. 
23, R94) 
In affirming the denial of a motion for new trial, 
this court stated in the case of P. A. Sorenson Co. v. 
Denver R. G. R. Co., 49 Utah 548, 164 Pac. 1020, 1021 
(1917), with respect to the jury's view of property 
which is the subject of litigation: 
At the trial, on the conclusion of the testi-
mony, the jury, after being admonished by the 
trial judge as to the purposes, were permitted 
to view the premises. Plaintiff contends that the 
trial judge failed to properly and sufficiently 
admonish the jury as to the purposes of the 
view, and thereafter failed to charge the jury 
as to what weight they should give to the knowl-
edge thereby. The record discloses that counsel 
for plaintiff was present in court. He made no 
objection whatever as to the jury not being 
properly admonished, nor did counsel request 
that more implicit instructions be then given. 
It will be seen therefore, assuming that there 
would be some merit to the contentions of coun-
sel, that it was due the trial court that they 
presented at a time when they could have been 
considered and acted upon before the conclusion 
of the trial, not on motion for a new trial, nor 
9 
on appeal to this court. However, the trial court 
did admonish the jury as to the purpose before 
the view, and, as we think, quite properly, by 
telling them-'N ot to talk about the case at all· 
to look is all you are to do. Not to take accounts'. 
measurements, or go out to act as detectives. 
Not to be searchers for anything that hasn't 
been brought before you or suggested to you. 
Just view the premises.' 
Contrary to the allegations of appellants herein, 
the record discloses they made no objection to the view 
of the property by the jury, nor did they object as to the 
jury not being properly admonished, nor did they 
request that more implicit instructions be then given. 
Respondent submits that the trial court in no way 
abused its discretion in allowing the jury to view the 
property involved in this action. Respondent further 
submits the appellants have failed to show such palpable 
abuse as would require this court to disturb the deci-
sion of the trial court to allow such view. 
B. THE JURY WAS NOT GUILTY OF l\IIS- 1 
CONDUCT NOR DID IT ACT IMPROPER-
LY OR CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S IN-
STRUCTIONS. 
As a general proposition, it can be said that every 
suitor is entitled to have his case tried before a quali-
fied and impartial jury. Accordingly, misconduct of 
the jury, when of a prejudicial character or such as 
to wararnt the belief that the fairness and propriety 
10 
of the trial has been impaired, or that injury has re-
sulted therefrom, is recognized in all jurisdictions as 
proper cause for a new trial. However, it is well 
established that not every instance of misconduct by 
a juror will require a new trial. The general principle 
underlying the case is that the misconduct must be 
such as to affect the impartiality of the jury or dis-
qualify them from exercising the powers of reason and 
judgment. A new trial will not be granted for mis-
conduct of the jury if no substantial harm was done 
thereby to the party seeking the new trial if there is 
nothing to indicate any improper bias upon the juror's 
mind, or if the court cannot see that the alleged mis-
conduct either had, or might have had, an effect un-
favorable to the moving party. See 39 Am. J ur., New 
Trial,§ 70 (1942). 
Furthermore, the traditional rule that a new trial 
will not be ordered where it is apparent that the result 
of another trial would be the same as that of the trial 
which has been had is, of course, applicable as respects 
new trials sought on the ground of misconduct. See 39 
Am. Jur. New Trial, § 28 (1942). 
Respondent submits that in the instant case there 
occurred no misconduct on the part of the jury. Further, 
that the alleged examination of the interior of certain 
of the improvements at the appellants' property was 
not misconduct or such as would create bias in the 
mind of the jury or would be of such prejudicial char-
acter as to ·warrant a new trial since, respondent sub-
11 
mits, it i~ apparent the result ofanother trial would be 
the same as that of the trial from which appellants now 
appeal. 
Whether the view of the premises by the jury 
could have had any prejudicial effect must be con-
sidered in light of all the evidence in the case. \Vhen 
the viewing is considered in light of the facts, supported 
by the evidence, it appears not to be prejudicial. 
The jury indicated by their verdict and the polling 
following the delivery of the verdict that it was unani-
mous ( TR-221). No error has been shown which would 
justify nullifying their verdict. 
Respondent submits that the entire basis of this 
appeal is the fact that the jury chose not to award 
appellants any severance damages. Admittedly, as 
pointed out by appellants on page 11 of their brief, 
there was a discrepancy in the estimates of damage 1 
between appraisers for respondent - § 75,432 (TR-
153) and the appraisers for the appellants,-$141,500 
(TR-79) and $152,921 (TR-123), respectively. The , 
appraiser for respondent testified that in his opinion 
the appellant landowners were not entitled to any seY· 
erance damage (TR-155-158). See also Ex. P-15). 
Appellants' appraisers testified respectively to $13,2-U 
(TR-90. See also Ex. D-12) and $34,350 (TR-123. 
See also Ex. D-13) as to severance damage. 
The jury had the benefit of opinions from three 
qualified experts as to the value of the land. Although 
12 
these opuuons varied considerably, it was within the 
prerogative of the jury to believe whom it chose, and 
it chose to believe respondent's expert rather than the 
appellants'. 
\Vheu a jury verdict is supported by competent 
evidence, as was here the case, it is generally left 
unaltered by this court. In this case, the alleged mis-
conduct of the jury and alleged error committed by 
the judge in allowing the jury to view the premises, 
which could alter this rule, has not been demonstrated. 
Appellants are trying to use the affidavits of cer-
tain jurors to impeach and overthrow their verdict con-
trary to the generally accepted view that such cannot 
be done. 
Ctah R. Civ. P. 59 (a) sets forth the grounds on 
which a new trial may be granted and in what instances 
the affidavit of a juror may be used. It states: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted ... for any 
of the following causes; 
* * * 
( 2) :Misconduct of the jury; and whenever 
any one or more of the jurors have been induced 
to assent to a general or special verdict, or . . . 
to a determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
In the recent case of Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 
:2d :240, 242, 408 P.2d 709 (1965), this Court stated 
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with respect to the use of affidavits or jurors to show 
misconduct under Rule 59: 
This rule is iu complete accord with our 
statutes and decisions on granting a new trial 
prior to and since the adopting of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1950 .... , we have 
continued to follow the law· as previously estab-
lished, and it is inconceivable that there was 
any intention to change the law as previously 
established in this state to authorize a showing 
of misconduct of the jury by filing affidavits 
of the jurors on any misconduct or irregularity 
except to show that one or more of the jurors 1 
were induced to assent to a finding by resort 
to a determination by chance or bribery. 
In affirming judgment for defendant in this per-
sonal injury action, the court continued: 
Plaintiff makes no claim that its affidavits 
even indicate that any juror was induced to ;, 
assert to any provision or part of this verdict 
by resort to chance or bribery so these affi-
davits do not meet the requirements of Rule 
59 and were not admissable. 
Affidavits of jurors will not be received to show r 
the grounds on which a jury verdict is rendered, nor 
to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, nor 1 
that they misunderstood the charge of the court, or 
the effect of their verdict, nor their opinions, surmises, 
and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict. 
See Wheat v. Denver and R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 
418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952); Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 
2d 68, 262 P.2d 278 (1953). 
14 
Appellants herein do not claim that their affidavits 
even indicate that any juror was induced to assent to 
any provision or part of this verdict by resort to chance 
or bribery. As such, they do not meet the requirements 
of Rule 59 and hence do not establish adequate or 
sufficient grounds for a new trial based on alleged jury 
misconduct. 
Although the trial court did indicate that a view 
of the interior of the improvements would be of no 
particular benefit to the jury (TR-203), there was no 
specific charge or admonition to the jury that they were 
not to examine the interior of the improvements. Con-
sequently, respondent submits the jury could not have 
been guilty of any of the misconduct as alleged by 
appellants. 
Since the appellants felt obliged to obtain the 
affidavits of certain jurors to support their motion for 
new trial, respondent felt obliged to obtain and file 
counter-affidavits to rebut the allegations contained 
in appellants' motion, since to fail to do so has been 
held to constitute an admission of the truth of the 
allegations contained in appellants' motion for new 
trial and the supporting affidavits. See Butler v. Com-
1nonwealth Department of Highwa;zJS, ____ Ky. ____ , 387 
S. \V .2d 687 ( 1967) . However, respondent submits that 
at the hearing on appellants' motion, neither the appel-
lant's affidavits nor the respondent's counter-affidavits 
were considered by the trial court. 
YVith respect to the claim by appellant that the 
15 
jury award was penurious and inadequate resulting 
from the view by the jury of the property in question, 
respondent submits that the defendant landowners have 
the burden of establishing their damages in eminent 
domain proceedings, and that in no way were the appel-
lants deprived of a fair trial or their right of fully 
presenting to the jury the legitimate aspects of dam-
ages for the taking of their property; and the jury's 
award was well within the appraisal shown by the evi-
dence. See State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 
P.2d 76 (1961). The award was within the estimate 
of value given by one of the expert witnesses, and being 
thus supported by competent evidence is entitled to the 
recognition and affirmation of this court. The fact 
that the jury chose to render its verdict in harmony 
"'ith the lowest of the available evaluations is not in 
itself cause for revarsal. See Weber Basin Conservancy 
D~trict v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
This court has previously held that it should over· 
rule the trial court's denial of a new trial involving a 
jury verdict only when, upon a survey of all the evi-
dence and reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from, and when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict, the amount of the award cannot be 
justified from the evidence on any reasonable basis. 
The trial judge should not grant a new trial merely 
because in his opinion the amount of the award was 
insufficient or excessive. Such action is warranted only 
when, to the trial judge; it seems clear that the jury 
has misapplied or failed to take into account proven 
16 
facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or 
made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
See Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 
( 1958); Paul v. Kirkendall, et al., I Utah 2d 350, 366 
P.2d 701 ( 1961) at page 354: 
. . . since the trial judge has seen and heard 
the witnesses and had a first hand view of all 
the evidence, and the proceedings throughout 
the trial and has ruled on the admissability of 
the evidence, and has instructed the jury on the 
law governing their verdict, and had opportu-
nity of observing the tactics of the counsel 
throughout the trial and the jury's reaction 
thereto, his ruling on a motion for a new trial 
should not be overruled unless it clearly appears 
that he has abused his discretion. 
Respondent submits that in this instance the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' 
motion for additur, or, in the alternative, for new trial. 
Further, there is no showing of misconduct on the 
part of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from an examination of the record 
in this case that the jury verdict was well supported 
by the evidence. Appellants have failed to show any 
misconduct on the part of the jury. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view the 
property which \vas the subject of this litigation or in 
17 
denying appellants' motion for additur, or, in the alter-
native, for new trial. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judg-
ment of the district court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
'VARREN ~I. WEGGELAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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